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Fall 2004

Redefining the Self: Tracing Identity in Natural, Cultural, and
Psychological Landscapes in Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*

The purpose of my analysis is to examine Lemuel Gulliver's behavioral and ideological conformity within the context of recent social constructivist theory. In so doing, I will concentrate specifically on the arguments found in Daniel Eilon's *Factions' Fictions: Ideological Closure in Swift's Satire*, Frances Deutsch Louis's *Swift's Anatomy of Misunderstanding: A Study of Swift's Epistemological Imagination in a Tale of a Tub and Gulliver's Travels*, and Denis Donoghue's essay, "The Brainwashing of Lemuel Gulliver" which contribute to a growing corpus of modernist readings of Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*. Some of the questions I will consider are: If Gulliver was successfully brainwashed in England, as Donoghue suggests, then why does he exhibit such an imperfect understanding of the complexities that define the principles which shaped Western society? If Gulliver is also brainwashed by his hosts, as Donoghue suggests, then by what authority does he continually transgress the rules of law that govern their societies? Specifically, why does he knowingly commit acts of disobedience and heresy if he has been successfully indoctrinated into their social systems?

In his essay, Donoghue contends that Gulliver has been brainwashed by not only his native society, but also his *host-societies*,¹ the implications of which are that Gulliver's observations are prejudiced by a continuing process of brainwashing that deprives him of place-identity. The consequences are that Gulliver does not have individual freedom to make choices

contrary to his host's expectations. However, within the novel, place-identity is employed as a theme to facilitate the narrative mode. The protagonist, Gulliver, struggles to link fragments of his past in order to create a new socio-spatial identity in response to changing natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes.

Swift appropriates the Self/Other opposition and spatially reconstitutes it in terms of the binary opposition between conceptions of "rational" and "non-rational" representations within his novel. These classifications are further qualified according to perceived physical features and attributes: "I remember when I was at *Lilliput*. . . . He said, he could discover great Holes in my Skin . . . and my Complexion . . . altogether disagreeable: Although I must beg Leave to say for my self, that I am as fair as most of my Sex and Country (II.i.71). Thus, Gulliver's socio-spatial identity is inscribed according to physical referents that determine his proximity to members of dominant cultures he experiences.

The misapplication of significations of place-identity causes a rupture in Gulliver's personal narrative. He is displaced through a prejudicial criteria for defining socio-spatial identity within dominant cultures and must seek traces of his identity to enable the process of constructing and deconstructing reality in order to exist and function. It is through the process of constructing reality that Gulliver negotiates absences by seeking traces of memory to compose his personal narrative. How Gulliver sorts through his conceptions, interpretations, and beliefs about his relation to his surroundings suggests his success in tracing the absence of a place-identity that would inform and sustain his subjective self and allow him to fulfill his desire to create a personal narrative written in the context of "belonging."

I will use Jacques Derrida's writings as a paradigm for critiquing *Gulliver's Travels* by

evaluating and analyzing the dynamic tension that develops between the ideas of trace, presence, and absence in the novel. I will consider how Derrida's notion of the trace left by the absent sign in the process of signification may be applied to Gulliver's loss of place-identity. I intend to use a supradisciplinary approach for evaluating and analyzing the dynamic tension that develops between Gulliver's conceptions of the presence and absence of "belonging" within his personal history of being. I will consider how Derrida's notion of the trace left by the absent sign in the process of signification may affect the continuity of place-identity. Although, in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida adapts trace as a theoretical term in relation to a number of "nonsynonymic substitutions"(e.g., differance, arche-writing, and spacing), I will be attempting to isolate trace as a by-product of the presence-absence opposition within the context of Swift's novel. I will examine the ways in which Gulliver responds to absence and presence by tracing his place-identity in order to reconstitute his narrative history of being.

There are numerous works that allude to the themes of memory, presence, and absence, and are available for inclusion within my essay.² However, I will be concentrating my investigation on selections from critical works that incorporate the themes as supporting corollaries to my analysis of Swift's novel. I will demonstrate how the concepts of self and other are spatially reconstituted in terms of presence and absence, to suggest that Gulliver experiences "belonging" not as an absence, but rather as a presence which has not actually been present in his life. Presence, therefore, "presents itself as intelligible only in terms of multiple historical pasts"(*New West* 58) or multiple histories of being. How Gulliver reorientates himself, in response to such knowledge, determines either his success or failure in signifying place-identity as a "substructure of the self."³

Gulliver attempts to “reconcile unity and identity,” to exist as both self and other, “I” and “we,” rational and human. Thus, even as Swift’s protagonist struggles to define himself in terms of social and spatial relations, he is always trying to restore what he has lost: i.e., a sense of belonging. Although racism and bigotry serve as convenient metaphors for linking Swift’s protagonist to existing historical narratives, his inability to maintain a dialogue with his past denies him the knowledge necessary for creating a personal narrative.

Communities change; societies rise and fall; but, there is a fundamental system of self-knowledge that operates within the subconscious. It is a knowledge that assures self-preservation, beyond any sense of cultural or moral imperatives. Gulliver seeks a usable past that would correspond to his emergent sense of self. In *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue that through the process of socialization:

The individual internalizes the new reality, but instead of its being *his* reality, it is a reality to be used by him for specific purposes. Insofar as this involves the performance of certain roles, he retains subjective detachment *vis-à-vis* them—he “puts them on” deliberately and purposefully.⁴

From such reasoning I contend that as Gulliver is absorbed within distinct socio-spatial orders, he accepts the classifications imposed on him, because they provide him with orientation and distinction. However, Gulliver gradually divorces himself from the values of the dominant cultures, because he is interested in recording and observing their activities, to confirm the superiority of the subjective self over the other consciousnesses of the objective world.

Gulliver attempts to mend psychological and ideological ruptures by integrating elements of knowledge from his natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes into an operative system of

self-knowledge. Gulliver's self-knowledge threatens the *status quo* within the dominant cultures by placing him at the solipsistic center of the universe, orchestrating his observations to maintain the subjective self. Gulliver's unwillingness to fulfill the social expectations of either the dominant cultures or his ancestral culture prevents his assimilation and necessitates a revision of his personal narrative. Instead of internalizing truths that are learned in the course of socialization, Gulliver dismisses them within his subjective reality.

Like his hosts, Gulliver has been socially conditioned by his native culture. He has been provided with a selection of priorities and preferences that are synthesized within his consciousness to shape his world-view ("Brainwashing" 132). However, Gulliver is confronted by conceptions that force him to perceive himself from a point of view that is no longer distinctly English: "I told them, I was born in *England*, from whence I came about five Years ago, and then their Country and ours was at Peace. I therefore hoped they would not treat me as an Enemy, since I meant them no Harm, but was a poor *Yahoo*, seeking some desolate Place where to pass the Remainder of his unfortunate Life"(IV.xi.250).

The process of re-socialization continues throughout Gulliver's stay in the host-societies. As Michael Seidel suggests, "In satiric invective the urge to *re-* form is literally overwhelmed by the urge to annihilate."⁵ The *re-*socializing of Gulliver does not purge him of his [native] language, his culture, or his history. Rather, it forces him to confront "interest-laden social [and cultural] categories"⁶ that impose new criteria for defining his identity according to new routines and expectations:

The King . . . conceived I might be a piece of Clockwork, (which is in that Country arrived to a very great Perfection) contrived by some ingenious Artist . . . His Majesty sent for three great Scholars. . . . They all agreed that I could not be

produced according to the regular Laws of Nature; because I was not framed with a Capacity of preserving my Life After much Debate, they concluded unanimously that I was only *Relplum Scalpath*, which is interpreted literally, *Lusus Naturae*, a Determination exactly agreeable to the Modern Philosophy of *Europe*. (II.iii.81-82)

Gulliver continually adapts his knowledge to secure a greater sense of purpose and belonging within the dominant cultures. “Social insideness,” to borrow from G.D. Rowles, is a mode of place identification that enables one to acknowledge “integration within the social fabric.”⁷ In their essay on “Displacing Place-Identity: A Discursive Approach to Locating Self and Other,” John Dixon and Kevin Durrheim further explicate how one’s sense of “social insideness” verifies place-identity: “Belonging, it seems, designates not just a phenomenological sense of one’s place in the world; it is also an ideological location from which the *in-place* and the *out-of-place* can be diagnosed” [Emphasis added.] (“Place-Identity” 39).

Gulliver does not find validation of the self within the ancestral or dominant cultural landscapes. He, therefore, creates a persona as a means for navigating discursive social and spatial fields. Gulliver embodies an enthusiastic Britishism that is in the process of invention and not complete. By playing the roles of surgeon, travel-writer, and Englishman, he seeks to trace the sense of belonging he has lost: the signification of national identity as a psycho-social qualifier: “I thought it necessary to disguise my Country, and call my self a *Hollander* . . .” (III.ix.174). Gulliver desires acceptance, even if it is but momentary, and necessitates the displacement of his historical past and a revision of his personal narrative.

Gulliver’s unwillingness to maintain a dialogue with his sub-cultural past denies him the knowledge necessary for tracing the absence of a personal narrative within the dominant culture.

Derrida would suggest the absence of a thing leaves a residue that indicates presence. Thus, even as Swift's protagonist struggles to define himself, he is always trying to restore the sense of belonging that he has lost

As Berger and Luckmann conclude, "no human thought . . . is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context" (9). However, they suggest that "[w]hile it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself"(49). Swift leaves it up to the reader to discern whether this dilemma may lead to Gulliver's condemnation by his *social others* or to Gulliver's absolution by acknowledging his own culpability in shaping his human condition.⁸ For instance, when Gulliver douses the fire in the Queen's apartments, he admits himself the superior being by making an offensive act seem valorous (I.v.36-38). However, by integrating part of human nature into an absurd experience, he makes the ineffectual power of his act the equivalent of his ineffectual condition and thus contradicts his concept of the superior existence.

Seamus Deane concludes that "[i]n Swift the body humiliates reason."⁹ Gulliver's offensive discharge strains the merits of civic virtue and is vilified by the Lilliputians as nothing more than a grotesque exhibition of a bodily function: "And I was privately assured, that the Empress conceiving the greatest Abhorrence of what I had done, removed to the most distant Side of the Court, firmly resolved that those Buildings should never be repaired for her Use; and, in the Presence of her chief Confidants, could not forbear vowing Revenge" (I.v.38). It also alludes how Swift's "scatology has hindered full investigation of his satiric accusations," which criticize "a public 'proud of its scientific attitude' a masterpiece of false facts which intimated that the new learners were more enthusiastic than discriminating about what they learned and that

they had been conditioned to a new form of gullibility” (*Swift’s Anatomy* 39).

Gulliver’s sense of social etiquette is suspended on account of the extraordinary events that befall him; however, could he not have directed himself toward a more fastidious course of action? Or, more to the point, why does he knowingly commit such a grievous offence within a civil society? Although Swift might be amused by our consideration of Gulliver’s behavior, he would not want us to forget the most salient point—Gulliver acted out of a physical need to relieve himself of drink, “called *Glimigrim*” (I.v.37); saving the Queen’s palace was therefore incidental to that fact.

Gulliver’s masterful ability to deny the gravity of his offense allows him to claim himself as the victim of his own actions. However, Gulliver clearly intimates an awareness that he has committed a violation of the “fundamental Laws of the Realm,” which preclude “any Person, of what Quality soever, to make water within the Precincts of the Palace” (I.v.37). Gulliver’s utilitarian concerns enable him to rationalize his violation of the Lilliputian law and to dismiss the gravity of his act. Through re-socializing, the individual “identifies with the socially objectivated typifications of conduct in *actu*, but re-establishes distance from them as he reflects about his conduct afterward” (73). Gulliver’s notions of what is a normal and acceptable “eminent Piece of Service” are derived from “the world of human nature,” and are counter to the notions of the Lilliputians, which are “cultural-bound” world-views (I.v.37).¹⁰ Ironically, in Book II, Gulliver admits his shame for a similar action: “I hid my self between two Leaves of Sorrel, and there discharged the Necessities of Nature (II.i.73). Berger and Luckmann state that:

Since it is relatively easier to invent things that never happened than to forget those that actually did, the individual may fabricate and insert events wherever they are needed to harmonize the remembered with the reinterpreted past. Since it

is the new reality rather than the old that now appears dominantly plausible to him, he may be perfectly ‘sincere’ in such a procedure—subjectively, he is not telling lies about the past but bringing it in line with *the* truth that, necessarily, embraces both present and past. (160)

Gulliver’s self-knowledge embraces both present and past but, it evolves in the name of specific values that are indeterminate to him. However, Gulliver is clearly intent on preserving his self-image even if that means lying to us: “I had been for some Hours extremely pressed by the Necessities of Nature *But this was the only Time I was ever guilty of so uncleanly an Action*; for which I cannot but hope the candid Reader will give some Allowance, after he hath maturely and partially considered my Case, and the Distress I was in (I.ii.12-13) [Emphasized].

As Jean-Paul Sartre states, “[when] the subject deceives himself about the *meaning* of his conduct, he apprehends it in its concrete existence but not in its *truth*, for lack of being able to derive it from an original situation and from a psychic constitution which remain alien to him.”¹¹ Gulliver inscribes truths that no longer match the facts of his existence: “I made up a Story as short and probable as I could, but concealed the greatest Part. . . . I was able to invent Names for my Parents, whom I pretended to be obscure People in the Province of *Guelderland*” (III.xi.186). As Sartre suggests, “By the lie consciousness affirms that it exists by nature as *hidden from the other*; it utilizes for its own profit the ontological duality of myself and myself in the eyes of others”(301 [Emphasized]). Gulliver lies and manipulates knowledge to suit his emergent place-identity.

In spite of engaging in a process of socialization within ancestral and dominant cultures, Gulliver’s decisions are his own and are announced by a subjective knowledge that attempts to

transcend common rationality. In *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty states that:

The perceived world has no basis outside of man confronting his tasks. Certainty is never achieved, even in the inner life, where we discover our misguided feelings and attitudes, respectively. We are always in the process of self-constitution. We bring to the perceptual and behavioral field a field which is our own history, and we express ourselves through their union. We choose our world and our world chooses us.¹²

Gulliver choose navigates the dominant cultures but is never fully accommodated or granted the acceptance he seeks. Gulliver's acts of disobedience and heresy may be considered indirectly the cathartic response of an individual who transgresses rules of law to communicate how his specific frame of reference contradicts the routines and expectations of his social others. Berger and Luckmann state that this process of decision-making:

opens a Pandora's box of "individualistic" choices, which eventually become generalized regardless of whether one's biographical course was determined by the "right" or the "wrong" choices. The individualist emerges as a specific social type who has at least the potential to migrate between a number of available worlds and who has deliberately and awarely constructed a self out of the "material" provided by a number of available identities. (171)

Gulliver is like the "individualist" Berger and Luckmann describe, in that he struggles to appropriate rules of conduct from conflicting natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes to serve the subjective self beyond the realm of absolute positivism.

This becomes apparent as Gulliver becomes unable, or unwilling, to distinguish perceptual fields. For example, when the King of Lilliput waves a sword before Gulliver "we might expect Gulliver to describe [it] as a toothpick; but what he actually says is that 'He held his Sword drawn in his Hand, to defend himself, if I should happen to break loose; it was almost

three Inches long . . .” (I.ii.14 [Swift’s *Anatomy* 127]). As Louis suggests:

[Gulliver] has lost sight of himself and capitulated to a ruler who is an entire ‘fingernail’ taller than his subjects, and who wields a weapon the size of an hors-d’oeuvre pick. Because the human ego cannot tolerate the need to surrender to powers beyond it somewhat better that it can stand to capitulate to those below it, psychological truth over-rides empirical in Lilliput, as Gulliver sees what he needs to see, not what he is so carefully computing. (127)

Gulliver describes the “ancient Temple”: “The great Gate fronting to the North was about four Foot high, and almost two Foot wide, through which I could easily creep” (I.i.11). He savors the taste of “a Sirloin so large, that I have been forced to make three Bites of it” (I.vi.45).

According to Sigmund Freud, “the ego is not master in its own house,” but yields to the “unconscious mental processes [of] incomplete and untrustworthy perceptions.”¹³ From such reasoning I contend that Gulliver’s experiences of the external world may at times be considered “incomprehensible, perhaps oppressive in their opaqueness, but [deceptively] real nonetheless” (Social Construction 60).

In *Existence and Being*, Jean-Paul Sartre develops a theory of self-deception which is relevant in this context. As Sartre stated, “*instinct* or, if you prefer, original drives and complexes of drives constituted by our individual history, make up *reality*. It is neither *true* nor *false* since it does not exist *for itself*. It simply *is*, exactly like [a] table, which is neither true nor false *in itself* but simply *real*” (303). Gulliver’s *instinct* is to choose to describe things not as they are, but as they need be in order to validate the subjective self. The realm of appearance is mastered by the conscious self. Gulliver’s inclusions and omissions are therefore purposeful, not accidental. Thus, the ways in which Gulliver recounts his experiences reveals to us the flawed psychological state of his consciousness.

In the opening of the narrative, Gulliver admits he has left his vocation because of his unwillingness to practice the corruption that has become so common to his profession (I.i.4). He intimates to the reader that he has tried various occupations, but has struggled to find his niche (I.i.3-4). The confusion Gulliver endures within his own world is minuscule when compared to the chaos that awaits him. The alien traditions and institutions Gulliver encounters disorient him and gradually force him to conform to the cultural imperatives that “[ratify] the social context theory of his personal identity, yet in another sense they challenge it” by attempting to redefine it.¹⁴ Gulliver responds to this situation by piecing together fragments of his perceived identity which develops “from erasures and re-writings of specular names” (“Self-Deception” 106).

Throughout his travels, Gulliver never refers to himself by his proper name. He accepts a succession of names given him by his hosts. As Wyrick suggests, “*Quinbus Flestrin* (Great Man Mountain,) *Grildrig* (mannikin), and *naiiah Yahoo* (gentle Yahoo) serve as proper names although they are actually generic descriptions, whereas *Nardac* (honored courtier), *Splacknuk* (weasel-like animal), and *Relplum Scalcat* (freak of nature) classify Gulliver within a set of cultural norms.”¹⁵ Each role assumed by the individual “opens an entrance into a specific sector of the [host-] society’s total stock of knowledge” which draws him further into the process of re-socialization (*Social Construction* 77). The degree to which the subjective self adapts to tasks or roles that are themselves situated within natural, cultural, and psychological contexts determines the success or failure of the individual’s socialization.

Gulliver’s historical existence is set in opposition to his non-existence as a member of the dominant cultures. However, *Gulliver’s lack of place-identity is not about simply applying an*

either/or, nor even *neither/nor* structure to fashion his identity. Thus, Gulliver sets himself in opposition to the residue left by the English symbolic identity *he* makes absent from his personal narrative. However, one cannot choose between presence and absence, between “what is” and “what was” or “what might have been.” Rather, one must consider the questions and the knowledge that such traces would force one to inscribe.

Rebuked by the dominant cultures and the English community from which he detached himself, Gulliver struggles to weave together the threads of his cultural, social, and political origins, to trace the absence of socio-spatial identity that would enable him to fulfill his personal narrative and sustain the subjective self. Gulliver’s unsuccessful mimicry of the dominant cultures’ norms and values and his frustration earning recognition from the English symbolic denies him a socio-spatial identity, according to the terms he uses to perceive himself. The absence of identity results in the “panic stricken production of the real.”¹⁶

The psychological structures Gulliver creates facilitate a dialogue with his natural environment that allows him to trace the presence of “belonging” in relation to the absence that informs it. Freud defined the term “memory-trace” to explain the ways in which we attempt to restore our knowledge of past experiences. As Derrida suggests, securing the trace memory is impossible, because as he suggests, “trace itself does not exist.”¹⁷ It is at this theoretical juncture that Gulliver’s search for place-identity would depart from Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and align more closely with Derrida. However, one of the problems with Derrida’s concept of trace as signification is that knowledge is filtered through a subjective lense. Thus, how are we to differentiate Gulliver’s trace of belonging from the absence that informs it?

As Pile and Thrift suggest, “Subjectivity and place cannot be separated without

foreclosing an understanding of the located subject and the agency of identity of place.”¹⁸ “[The] tendency to assimilate others’ [cultural viewpoints]” is a prerequisite for locating oneself within a particular social grouping.¹⁹ Thus, as Bahktin insists “another’s discourse performs here no longer as information, directions, rules, models and so forth—but strives rather to determine the very basis of our behavior; it performs here as authoritative discourse and an internally persuasive discourse” (*Dialogic Imagination* 342). Gulliver reconstitutes himself according to a subjective system of knowledge that embraces both present and past, but finds personal affirmation in neither of these realities. Gulliver attempts to reconstitute a “sense of locatedness through a symbolic process of emplotment: a form of self-creation whereby person-place relations are turned into a credible self-narrative”(“Place-Identity” 31).²⁰

For Gulliver, the seduction is about releasing himself from traditional significations used to impose identifications. Gulliver seeks to inscribe a new place-identity that amplifies his significance in relation to the prevailing cultural landscape that informs both the sub-culture and counterculture. His inscription of place-identity may be a seemingly daunting task, not only because the cultures are antagonistic and diametrically opposed to one another, but also, because Gulliver suffers from an over-inflated sense of self-worth that has been punctured by his inscription within the dominant culture as a “non-member” or “other.” However, rather than asking “Why am I not a member of this culture?” Gulliver would restate the question in terms of “How may I transcend the inscription of *otherness* that negates the possibility of belonging?”.

As E. Krupat suggests “The concept of place-identity makes explicit the key role that a person’s relationship to the environment plays not simply in terms of a context for action or in facilitating certain forms of behavior, but in becoming part of the person, of being incorporated

into one's concept of self."²¹ The repetition of performative acts of roleplaying fulfills the requirements of social identification, if only in a limited sense. The possibility for non-normative acts, within a counterculture, undermines the stability of identity categories by making performance imprecise. Thus, counterculture releases Gulliver from the gender roles and responsibilities he once assumed.

As Michel de Montaigne suggests, "we have no other ayme of truth and reason than the example and the idea of the customs of the countrie we live in."²² From such reasoning I contend that Gulliver's sense of self is in a constant state of evolution in response to the natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes he experiences. Swift elaborated upon the idea of *social relativism* and explained the "relation between proximity and allegiance and the rapid decay of sympathy when extended to distant objects" (47). As Swift stated, "Whoever lives at a different End of the Town from me, I look upon as Persons out of the World, and only myself and the Scene about me to be in it."²³ Although Gulliver acts in opposition to the ruling values of operative social and cultural formations, he contradictorily confirms the *status quo* in the process of reconstituting the reality he calls into question: "I could not deny the Facts alleged in the several Articles, yet I hoped they would admit of some Extenuations" (I.vii.52). Even if that status quo is promulgated by beings as evil and duplicitous as Gulliver's "mortal Enemy" (I.vii.48), *Skyresh Bolgolam*, the narrative offers Gulliver as its solipsistic center. The machination of personal narrative is to maintain the illusion on Gulliver's behalf: "I had sent so many Memorials and Petitions for my Liberty . . . These Articles were brought to me by *Skyresh Bolgolam* in Person, attended by two under Secretaries, and several Persons of Distinction" (I.iii.25).

Even after one suspects that Gulliver has been duped, particularly by himself, one may still relish the entertainment value of the artful deception. However, beneath the safely artificial world of the narrative, there is a chillingly subversive suggestion that if the interests of the individual are not sanctioned by society then they are subject to ridicule, denial, and expulsion. Swift integrates this motif into Gulliver's *misadventures* to suggest to us that an existing repertoire of images, themes, and ideas may be disseminated by social structures in order to preserve the interests of dominant cultures:

Although I cannot say that I was ill treated in this Island, yet I must confess I thought my self too much neglected, not without some Degree of *Contempt*. For neither Prince nor People appeared to be curious in any Part of Knowledge, except Mathematicks and Musick, wherein I was far their inferior, and upon that Account very little regarded. . . . I was weary of being confined to an Island where I received so little Countenance; and resolved to leave it with the first Opportunity (III.iv.147) [Emphasized].

Gulliver's shift in perspective causes the reduction of knowledge to maintain the purely individual or self-enclosed mental state.

Swift offers Gulliver's narrative as "a vision of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern"(130-31). As Donoghue concludes, "It often achieves this pattern by imposing upon its image of life a logical and self-consistent shift of perspective"(130-31). The shift of perspective causes the reduction of knowledge to maintain the purely individual or self-enclosed mental state: "For, indeed, while I was in that Prince's Country, I could never endure to look in a Glass after my Eyes had been accustomed to such prodigious Objects; because the Comparison gave me so despicable a Conceit of my self" (II.viii.122).

Deborah Wyrick suggests that "Gulliver's ability to contextualize his image in the

Brobdingnagian mirror by recognizing the dangers of decontextualized imagination indicates a concept of personal identity based on placement within a social network, an epistemology Swift shared with both Locke and Hobbes.”²⁴ In Book IV, Gulliver seeks to locate himself within the Houyhnhnm’s social network by mimicking their behavior:

When I happened to behold the Reflection of my own Form in a Lake or Fountain, I turned away my Face in Horror and detestation of my self; and could better endure the Sight of a common *Yahoo*, than of my own Person. By conversing with the *Houyhnhnms*, and looking upon them with Delight, I fell to imitate their Gait and Gesture, which is now grown into a Habit; and my Friends often tell me in a blunt Way, that *I trot like a Horse*; which, however, I take for a great Compliment . . . (IV.x.243-244).

Gulliver assumes incorrectly that by mimicking the behavior of Houyhnhnms, he may be accepted as one of them. As Louis suggests, “Gulliver cannot separate Houyhnhnm philosophy from Houyhnhnm physique” (160) Gulliver’s imitation of “a rational Creature” (IV.iii.202) cannot hide the fact that although he is intellectually similar to his hosts, he is physically different from them. The physical referents used to distinguish Gulliver from his hosts also become signifiers for defining his identity and anticipating his behavior.

Gulliver’s psychological constructions fail to insulate him from the demands of the dominant cultures. His understandings of science, religion, and politics do not prepare him for the new routines and expectations imposed on him; instead, they make him the object of accusations that challenge his veracity—which seems less reliable as the narrative progresses: “Yet thus much I may be allowed to say in my own Vindication; that I artfully eluded many of his Questions; and gave to every Point a more favourable turn by many Degrees than the strictness of Truth would allow” (II.vii.109). The conventional wisdom that was programmed

into Gulliver's consciousness in England is disrupted by his re-socialization within alien social systems. Gulliver's passive or active response to this process determines whether or not he has been successfully transformed or re-socialized within the host-cultures. For example, in Book IV Gulliver describes the "Art of War" to his Houyhnhnm master: "I could not forbear shaking my Head and smiling a little at his Ignorance" (IV.v.214). However, in Luggnagg Gulliver is "on the receiving end of the patronizing self-congratulatory knowingness" that is "paradigmatic of Swiftian irony," (*Factions*' 152) as his interpreter listens to his discourse "with a Sort of a Smile, which usually ariseth from Pity to the Ignorant" (III.x.178). As Eilon concludes, "familiarity is certainly not a quality of mind about which Swift is complacent . . . [however,] it is a valuable demeanor to maintain when challenging other people's assumptions"(150). According to Claude Levi-Strauss, "for man, all that is universal stems from the order of nature . . . and all that is linked to a norm . . . belongs to a culture and has the attributes of being relative and particular."²⁵ By attempting to adjust his logic to accommodate the unusual events of the narrative, Gulliver begins a process of reasoning wherein the familiar becomes the product of inversion and the objective phenomenon becomes the norm. Thus, all knowledge, including that which frames his socio-spatial identity, becomes speculative and predisposed to interpretation.

In *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Edmund Husserl, a noted German philosopher and founder of phenomenology, defined the term "Lebenswelt" as "a possible world of inter-subjective experiences" which provide the conscious individual with a frame of reference from which the individual apprehends and interprets the objective/external world.²⁶ However, the objective world resists the individual's attempts to

master it, despite the fact that it constitutes the individual's existence ("Objects not Transformed" 155-61). By limiting his analysis to descriptions of brainwashing, rather than selective socialization, Donoghue diminishes the salience of Gulliver's struggle with subjective values that inform his socio-spatial identity. Gulliver's acceptance of titles and appellations transforms him: "I had the Honour to be a *Nardac*, which the Treasurer himself is not; for all the World knows he is only a *Clumglum*, a Title inferior by one Degree [to my own]" (I.vi.46); "*Great Man Mountain*" (I.ii.17); "She gave me the Name of *Grildrig*, which the Family took up, and afterwards the whole Kingdom" (II.ii.74); "*Lusus Naturae*" (II.iii.82). By playing roles, Gulliver participates in the dominant cultures. By internalizing the roles, Gulliver navigates natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes that become real to him. Thus, he differentiates reality by "degrees of familiarity [and remoteness] . . . [which supply] the typificatory schemes required for the major routines of everyday life . . . of others . . . of all sorts of events and experiences, both social and natural" (*Social Construction* 43).

Gulliver interrelates with cultural and natural environments interpreted for him by others who have control of him and who moderate his behavior by inscribing his identity according to titles and appellations that signify the roles he *may* play within dominant cultures. Derrida offers "two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, [and] of play." The first is the "lost or impossible presence of the absent origin." The second is "the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin" (*Writing and Difference* 292). Gulliver fails to achieve Derrida's "joyous affirmation" and resolve the antagonistic relation between self and other by using the performative act as a means for reconstituting the dialectic of identity. Gulliver "plays"

the roles he is given in order to locate his place-identity within the dominant cultures. Gulliver is forced, therefore, to resolve problems and issues that do not routinely exist within the common sense knowledge of his everyday life. Gulliver's responses become exceptions to the norm as he fails to conform completely to the new routines and expectations of his hosts.

The opposition of the subjective self and the socially inscribed place-identity causes a rupture in Gulliver's ability to exercise practical judgment "My Horses understand me tolerably well; I converse with them at least four Hours every Day" (IV.xi.254). Gulliver's exercise of judgment is a condition of his self-knowledge and an actual possession of his consciousness:

My Wife and Family received me with great Surprize and Joy, because they concluded me certainly dead; but I must freely confess, the Sight of them filled me only with Hatred, Disgust and Contempt; and the more, by reflecting on the near Alliance I had to them. For, although since my unfortunate Exile from the *Houyhnhnm* Country, I had compelled myself to tolerate the Sight of *Yahoos*, and to converse with *Don Pedro de Mendez*; yet my Memory and Imaginations were perpetually filled with the Virtues and Ideas of those exalted *Houyhnhnms*. And when I began to consider, that by copulating with one of the *Yahoo*-Species, I had become a Parent of more; it struck me with the utmost Shame, Confusion and Horror (IV.xi.253-254).

As Sartre intimates "consciousness is not restricted to considering a *négativité*. It constitutes itself in its own substance as the annihilation of a possibility which another consciousness projects as its possibility."²⁷ Thus, as Gulliver accelerates through his travels, he submits continually to the roles his hosts have scripted for him.

In Lilliput, he is a giant ruled by mites; in Brobdingnag, he is a slave for his master: "I bowed . . . and humbly answered, that I was my Master's Slave;" a pet to the Queen and King of Brobdingnag: "I then said to the Queen; since I was now her Majesty's most humble Creature

and Vassal . . .” (II.iii.80); and a disciple to his Houyhnhnm master: “My principal Endeavour was to learn the Language, which my Master (for so I shall henceforth call him) and his Children, and every Servant of his House were desirous to teach me” (IV.iii.202). Through the process of socialization,

[t]he individual internalizes the new reality, but instead of its being *his* reality, it is a reality to be used by him for specific purposes. Insofar as this involves the performance of certain roles, he retains subjective detachment *vis-à-vis* them—he “puts them on” deliberately and purposefully. (*Social Construction* 172)

From such reasoning I contend that as Gulliver is absorbed within distinct social orders, he accepts the classifications imposed on him, because they provide him with orientation and distinction. However, Gulliver gradually divorces himself from the values of truth and morality that direct him, not because he is brainwashed by his hosts, but because he is interested in recording and observing their activities, to confirm the superiority of the subjective self over the other consciousnesses of the objective world: “To confirm what I have now said, and further to shew the miserable Effects of a *confined Education*” (II.vii.109).

Gulliver’s zealousness indicts other consciousnesses by insisting that they must share his perceptions to recognize truth.²⁸ Karl Mannheim’s theory of “utopian thought” applies to my evaluation of Gulliver’s intentions within this context. As Mannheim concluded, “utopian thought” produces a “distorted image of social reality, which has the dynamism to transform that reality into its image of it” (*Gulliver’s Mirror* 96). Gulliver’s attempt to confirm his superiority to the dominant cultures fails because he is re-socialized through new ideological norms and protocols of rationality which dispute and eventually disrupt the constancy of his world-view. Gulliver convinces *himself* that all he needs is *himself*. He speaks in the universal language of

mathematical and scientific concepts that classify the objects and the species he encounters. However, his attempts to impose criteria for calculating and measuring the physical world lead finally to the denigration of his socio-spatial identity.

In Lilliput, Gulliver's physical reduction enables him to elevate himself morally: "Once I was strongly bent upon Resistance: For while I had Liberty, the whole Strength of that Empire could hardly subdue me, and I might easily with Stones pelt the Metropolis to Pieces: But I soon rejected that Project with Horror, by remembering the Oath I had made to the Emperor" (I.vii.52). Conversely, his moral and physical superiority are disputed in Brobdingnag, where he becomes the object of curiosity "for the Diversion of the Queen and her Ladies" [II.iii.79]), and derision for the king: "My little Friend *Grildrig*; you have made a most admirable Panegyrick upon your Country I cannot but conclude the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth" (II.vi.107-108).

Eilon suggests that "Swift's satire often operates by insidiously undermining pretensions to uniqueness . . . [simplifying] his world picture by denying privileged special case status whenever possible. This form of denigration is an implicit effect of parody . . . [which emphasizes] the negation of individuality" (139). In order to agree with Donoghue's argument of brainwashing, one must review the narrative thoroughly and conclude that Gulliver is the product of successful indoctrination, lacking the will or desire to detach himself from the views of dominant cultures which determined the restrictions and conditions of his socio-spatial identity, an identity which continually opposed Gulliver's sense of self. However, to discredit such a hypothesis one need only consider a few of the passages provided which substantiate my claims

that the brainwashing of Gulliver fails because of his inability to stabilize a suitable place-identity that would accommodate the breath and scope of the natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes affecting his subjective knowledge (I.iii.25-27; II.iii.79-80).

Gulliver's modest success at achieving a sense of "belonging" enables him to create alternate interpretations of truths that once sustained his existence. His preoccupation with lavish appellations and privileged status suggests the degree to which he has been seduced by the process of socialization: "GOLBASTO MOMAREN EVLAME GURDILO SHEFIN MULLY ULLY GUE, most Mighty Emperor of *Lilliput* . . ." (I.iii.25); "I had the Honour to be a *Nardac*, which the Treasurer [Flimnap] himself is not; for all the World knows he is only a *Clumglum*, a Title inferior by one degree [to my own]" (I.vi.46). Gulliver's desire to belong distorts his perspective on his natural identity and forces him to recognize the absence of place-identity that dissolves the fixity of his past: "But being now a *Nardac*, of the highest Rank in that Empire, such Offices were looked upon as below my Dignity" (I.v.36). Gulliver orients himself within the dominant cultures with some degree of success.

In Lilliput, Gulliver grows fond of the local drink ("called *Glimigrim*" [I.v.37]), and adopts the language and customs of his hosts:

in about three Weeks I made a great Progress in Learning their Language the first Words I learnt, were to express my Desire, that he would please to give me my Liberty; which I every Day repeated on my Knees. His Answer, as I could apprehend, was, that this must be a Work of Time, not to be thought on without the Advice of his Council; and that first I must *Lumos Kelmin pesso desmar lon Emposo*; that is, *Swear a Peace with him and his Kingdom* (I.ii.16).

Ironically, Gulliver's misapplication of language recapitulates his abject servitude to the Emperor of Lilliput and he is unable to discern how his capitulation of Lilliputian culture has conditioned

him to tolerate disjunctions within the social system. Gulliver's assimilation of traditions distorts his perspective, affirming his identification to the pettiness within the dominant culture.

In Brobdingnag, Gulliver becomes "disappointed" by the sight of the tower at the chief temple, which is "reckoned the highest in the Kingdom," but on closer inspection is not "above three thousand Foot" in height (II.iv.91). Gulliver is no longer an objective observer but, rather, he is the subject of observation and playful curiosity: "For, I apprehended every Moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any little hateful Animal which we have a Mind to destroy. But my good Star would have it, that he appeared pleased with my Voice and Gestures, and began to look upon me as a Curiosity; much wondering to hear me pronounce articulate Words, although he could not understand them" (II.i.67). Gulliver is inscribed according to a socio-spatial identity of subhuman: "a small dangerous Animal" (II.i.67); "*Grildrig*" (II.ii.74). The scholars of Brobdingnag try unsuccessfully to identify Gulliver with one of the creatures they are more readily acquainted, i.e. dwarves and embryos (II.iii.82); a cocker spaniel considers him a chew-toy (II.v.93), and the court's monkey identifies him as a young one of his own species (II.v.97-100). Gulliver is classified according to an "otherness" that distinguishes his existence as a technique for containing, controlling, and, ultimately, purging him from the dominant cultures.

Similarly, in Book IV, the Yahoos look on him as one of their own; something he cannot deny once he is assaulted by female Yahoos who exhibit "a natural Propensity to me as one of their own Species"(IV.viii.233). Gulliver's appearance is too much like a Yahoo's to allow him to be considered a Houyhnhnm: "When I happened to behold the Reflection of my own Form in a Lake or Fountain, I turned away my Face in Horror and detestation of my self; and could better

endure the Sight of a common *Yahoo*, than of my own Person” (IV.x.243). Gulliver is not able to dissuade the Houyhnhnm council from voting against his membership within their society as he “knew too well upon what solid Reasons all the Determinations of the wise *Houyhnhnms* were founded, not to be shaken by Arguments of mine, a miserable *Yahoo* . . .” (IV.x.245). Gulliver admits that “*Reason* alone is sufficient to govern a *Rational* Creature;” however, man’s “gross Defects in *Reason*, and by consequence in, *Virtue*” inhibit his entry into this epistemological category and prevent his assimilation within the dominant culture (IV.vii.225). Gulliver reveals the identity to which dominant cultures inscribe his body and mind as having semiotic statuses. Although he may alter his appearance, and may practice a new rationality, he cannot deny “otherness” as a symptom of his human condition.

As Hermann J. Real and Heinz J. Vienken suggest, Gulliver’s fate reveals “man cannot live by reason alone. Pure reason destroys man’s sociability.”²⁹ Thus, ‘*animal rationale*’ is unattainable for the *homo sapien* that evolves into the *homo socius*.³⁰ The context of the previous citation relates to Berger and Luckmann’s conclusion that “human knowledge is given in society as an *a priori* to individual experience, providing the latter with its order of meaning . . . [which] appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world.”³¹ There in lies the problem that inhibits Gulliver’s successful re-socialization within the dominant cultures. Gulliver has lost his sense of belonging, but he has also lost his ability to perceive his relation to natural and cultural landscapes. Thus, in spite of examples which seem to suggest Gulliver’s subordination to his hosts, Gulliver does not complete the process of re-socialization and must exit the dominant cultures. I would suggest further that even though Gulliver acquiesces to the values of the dominant cultures, he is eventually expelled from them because he cannot fulfill the most salient

requirement of membership: the inscription of new socio-spatial identity that would contradict his sense of self by imposing upon him an otherness that would disrupt the continuity of his historical past and deny the value of his human condition. As Tammy Clewell suggests in her critical study on deconstructionism:

What the lost other and the historical past have in common is the quality of radical otherness, an alterity that resists assimilation by either the mourning subject or social present. To recognize alterity, at least in a certain sense, can appear as a dangerous and disruptive force lodged within the self and the subject's experience of the social.³²

One's conceptions of self are relative to the environment. The ways in which one acts and is acted upon within a given landscape determines one's perceptions of self but also allow one to locate one's self within social groupings.

When one wanders through shopping malls, food courts, and fast-food restaurants, one is oblivious to their unnatural aesthetic quality. Through repetition and habit, one begins to weave man-made narratives into the tapestry of natural surroundings. How one then goes about replicating one's narrative suggests the affects of social assimilation upon place-identity. As Derrida intimates, it is through repetition that we are "fulfilled . . . by remaining open, by pronouncing non-closure."³³ This is the problem Gulliver struggles with throughout the narrative; specifically in Books II and IV, where Gulliver craves the acceptance of social others, an acceptance that can only be attained through successful re-socialization, which is made not possible by the ideological closure of the dominant cultures. Gulliver, therefore, cannot be completely "brainwashed," as Donoghue suggests, by the members of the dominant cultures because they must eschew or deny his existence in order to assure their own.

The dubious honors and distinctions bestowed on Gulliver transmute his historical

identity—which is one aspect of human order that sustained the subjective self. His tacit acceptance of the identities imposed on him initiates a process wherein, by pulling on the threads of his subconscious, he unravels the fabric of the entire universe and initiates his own moral and psychological disintegration. Thus, as Gulliver steps from one mishap to the next, it is apparent that he is internalizing misconceptions to aggrandize the subjective self. Gulliver, therefore, negotiates the truth of his immediate reality to create a more desirable self-image—even though it is constructed from misidentification.

In *Gulliver's Travels*, Swift peels back the layers of interpretation to reveal the plurality of truths that compose “proprietary value systems and patterns of reasoning cultivated by collusive [social and political] collectives” (*Factions' Fictions* 16). “Swift’s ironic strategies (culminating in the comparative cultural perspectives of *GT*) strip away at the complacent assumptions that can turn consensus” into a device for marginalizing individuality within a presumably pluralistic society (16). The individual’s desire to belong makes the individual subject to preferences of dominant cultures, which administer opinions that shape confining and limiting-systems of knowledge used to define the individual’s place-identity, through restrictive social and cultural categories that inscribe one’s identity, anticipate one’s behavior, and limit one’s ability to transcend prescriptions of identity.

Gulliver's Travels forms from a continual flow of symbolism and allusion, which augment its appeal by integrating banal moments of human experience, such as ingestion and defecation, day and night, and life and death, into a profound allegorical journey to validate one’s existence by reconciling the inherent contradictions between subjective truths and objective reality:

I began to view the Actions and Passions of Man in a very different Light; and to think the Honour of my own kind not worth managing; which, besides, it was impossible for me to do before a Person of so acute a Judgment as my Master, who daily convinced me of a thousand Faults in my self, whereof I had not the least Perception before, and which with us would never be numbered even among human Infirmities. I had likewise learned from his Example an utter Detestation of all Falsehood or Disguise; and *Truth* appeared so amiable to me, that I determined upon sacrificing every thing to it (IV.vii.224).

The previous passage suggests that the cumulative effects of Gulliver's conditioning have altered his conception of the self. Gulliver's accumulated knowledge should inspire him to transmute the subjective self and locate his place-identity within dominant cultures. However, the Houyhnhnm council's sentence of banishment instigates Gulliver's final retreat into the subjective self:

But I shall not trouble the Reader with a particular Description of my own Mechanics. . . . I finished a Sort of *Indian Canoo*; but much larger, covering it with the Skins of *Yahoos*, well stitched together, with hempen Threads of my own making. My Sail was likewise composed of the Skins of the same Animal . . . (IV.x.246).

The image of Gulliver methodically building a boat from the skins of Yahoo confirms the detached-brutishness of man and alludes to his inability to escape his human condition. The process of socialization governs Gulliver's interaction, influences his perspective, and manipulates his understanding of the inequalities that fragment societies.

Gulliver responds to the process of socialization by reorienting himself to new perceptual fields. However, he fails in this attempt and is not able to adapt his logic to formulate "prescriptions of meaning" that would "hold their integrity against the onslaughts of interpretation" (*Vested Word* 104). Consequently, he sinks deeper into the fragmented subjective self. Gulliver's socialization culminates when he is rejected by his hosts and is forced into exile. Rejection is the final psychological stage of socialization. In this stage, Gulliver retreats into the

“autonomous consciousness” of the subjective self (“Self-Deception” 306). As Gulliver adjusts himself, either by accepting or rejecting what he has learned, one may discern the degree to which he has been transformed by the dominant cultures:

Having thus answered the *only* Objection that can be raised against me as a Traveller; I here take a final Leave of my Courteous Readers, and return to enjoy my own Speculations in my little Garden at *Redriff*; to apply those excellent Lessons of Virtue which I learned among the *Houyhnhnms*; to instruct the *Yahoos* of my own Family as far as I shall find them docible Animals; to behold my Figure often in a Glass, and thus if possible habituate my self by Time to tolerate the Sight of a human Creature: To lament the Brutality of *Houyhnhnms* in my own Country, but always treat their Persons with Respect, for the Sake of my noble Master, his Family, his Friends, and the whole *Houyhnhnm* Race, whom these of ours have the Honour to resemble in all their Lineaments, however their Intellectuals came to degenerate (IV.xii.259).

Gulliver’s parting words indicate a psychological transformation. However, his failure to associate himself with the “human creature” he indicts suggests he is leaning precariously on an unstable moral footing.

The defensive mechanisms of the human ego prevent the transcendence of the subjective self, to perceive things from an objective point of view. The ways in which Gulliver affirms the self as a separate and distinct entity suggest his desire to be master of his own world. Throughout his travels, Gulliver yields continually to systems of classification that honor, deify, criticize, censure, chastise, scorn, and eventually condemn him to death or to banishment. His empirical search for a socio-spatial identity ultimately fails because he is unable to recognize that his accumulated life-experiences cannot be condensed into absolutely subjective truths. Rather, he must participate in a process of creation by struggling with the incompleteness and inherent contradictions of interpretations which inevitably must be harmonized from within the subjective

self and from without the collective selves to enable the emergence of a place-identity that is at once constructive and deconstructive, expressive and elliptical, abstract and conceptual, theatrical and hermetic, and perhaps above all informed by the dialectic of natural, cultural, and psychological landscapes.

Notes

1. I have coined the term *host-societies* to refer generally to the inhabitants of orders Gulliver encounters throughout the narrative.
2. The following titles are insightful contributions to a growing corpus of readings on memory, trace, and presence-absence. See John Sutton's, *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998); Lina Bolzoni's "The Play of Images: The Art of Memory from Its Origins to the Seventeenth Century," in P. Corsi (ed.) *The Enchanted Loom: Chapters in the History of Neuroscience* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 16-26; Robyn Fivush and Elaine Reese "The Social Construction of Autobiographical Memory," in M Conway (ed.) *Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory* (New York: Kluwer, 1992) 115-32; Robert N. McCauley "Walking in Our own Footsteps: Autobiographical Memory and Reconstruction," in U. Neisser and E. Winograd (eds.) *Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988) 126-44; James L. McClelland "Constructive Memory and Memory Distortions: A Parallel-Distributed Processing Approach," in D.L. Schacter (ed.) *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995) 69-90.
3. John Dixon and Kevin Durrheim, "Displacing Place-Identity: A Discursive Approach to Locating Self and Other," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 39 (2000) 27-44, here 32.
4. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966) 172.
5. Michael Seidel, *Satiric Inheritance: Rabelais to Sterne* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979) 3-4.
6. The term "interest-laden social categories" is taken from Vincent B. Leitch's *Cultural Criticism, Literary Theory, and Poststructuralism* (New York: Columbia UP, 1992) 39.
7. See G.D. Rowles, "Place and Personal Identity in Old Age : Observations from Appalachia," *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 3 (1983) 299-313.
8. The term "social others" is derived from "significant others" in George Herbert Mead's theory of the ontogenesis of the self, which is presented in *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1964). A valuable compendium of Mead's writings is Maurice Natanson's *The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs P, 1956).
9. See Seamus Deane, "Swift: Virtue, Travel, and the Enlightenment," *Walking Naboth's Vineyard: New Studies of Swift*, ed. Christopher Fox and Brenda Tooley (Notre Dame: U of ND Press, 1995) 35.
10. The term "cultural-bound" is taken from Deane 24.

11. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Self-Deception and Falsehood," *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) 303.
12. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (1945; London: Routledge, 1962) See Preface.
13. Sigmund Freud, "One of the Difficulties of Psychoanalysis," *On Creativity and the Unconsciousness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958): 1-10.
14. Deborah B. Wyrick, *Jonathan Swift and the Vested Word* (Chapel Hill: U of NC P, 1988) 106.
15. Wyrick 106. As Wyrick elaborates "Swift evidently performed similar categorical naming in life. He bestowed mock-pastoral names upon female beggars in Dublin; the epithets were determined by their diseases and deformities (e.g., "Cancerina" and "Stumpa-Nympha"). See Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962-1983) 812-13.
16. See David Ashley's essay on "Postmodernism and Antifoundationalism," in *Postmodernism & Social Inquiry* (eds.) David R. Dickens and Andrea Fontana (New York: Guilford P, 1994) 53-75, here 54. The volume, *Postmodernism & Social Inquiry*, offers a number of critical essays by scholars in the Humanities and Social Sciences which analyze and evaluate "Postmodern Theories of Society" and "Postmodern Research Methods."
17. Gayatri Spivak provides a translation of Derrida's revolutionary theories of deconstruction, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and structuralism, which have affected European and English criticism. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976) 167.
18. See S. Pile and N. Thrift, "Conclusions: Spacing and the Subject." *Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation*. S. Pile & N. Thrift (Eds.) (London: Routledge, 1995) 371-380, here 280.
19. See Mikhail Bahktin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (ed.) Michael Holquist, (trans.) Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981).
20. Human geographers Y.F. Tuan and D. Gutting have considered the ways in which linguistic traditions like story-telling affect the creation of place-identities. See D. Gutting, "Narrative Identity and Residential History," *Area* 28 (1996) 482-90. Also, see Y.F. Tuan, "Language and the Making of Place: A Narrative-Descriptive Approach," in the *Annals of the Association of English Geographers* 81 (1991) 684-96.
21. See E. Krupat's article on "A Place for Place Identity," from the *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 3 (1983) 343-44, here 343.

22. Michel de Montaigne, "Of the Canibales," *The Essays of Montaigne*, trans. John Florio, facsimile, vol. 3 (1603; New York: AMS Press, 1967) 222.
23. The quotation is from Swift and may be found in Alexander Pope's *Works*, ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966) 253.
24. See Wyrick 106. For further readings on the subject, see Leo Braudy's "Penetration and Impenetrability in *Clarissa*," in *New Approaches to Eighteenth-Century Literature: Selected Papers from the English Institute*, ed. Philip Harth (New York: Columbia UP, 1974) 176-206; and Frederik M. Keener's *The Chain of Becoming/The Philosophical Tale, the Novel, and a Neglected Realism of the Enlightenment: Swift, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Johnson, and Austen* (New York: Columbia UP, 1983) 89-126.
25. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté* (Paris: PU de France, 1949) 9.
26. See Section iii: "Freiburg, 1916-1928," of "The Development of Husserl's Thought," by J.N. Mohanty, in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, ed. Barry Smith and David W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 63-65.
27. See Sartre 299. Kaufmann defines "négativité" as Sartre's term for the "kinds of human experience which blend negative and positive—such as absence, change, otherness, repulsion, [and] regret." See Kaufmann 381.
28. W. B. Carnochan, *Lemuel Gulliver's Mirror for Man* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1968) 96.
29. Hermann J. Real and Heinz J. Vienken, "The Structure of *Gulliver's Travels*," *Proceedings of the First Münster Symposium on Jonathan Swift* (Münster: Wilhelm, Fink, Verlag, & München, 1985) 208.
30. The relativity of man's humanity and sociality is developed further in the concluding section of Emile Durkheim's *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1925; London: Simon & Schuster, 1990).
31. Max Scheler developed the term *relativnatürliche Weltanschauung* or "relative-natural world view" in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Berne: Francke, 1960).
32. Tammy Clewell examines the ways in which Toni Morrison responds to African American history by placing her fictions at the center of discussions about mourning. See Clewell's, "From Destructive to Constructive Haunting in Toni Morrison's *Paradise*," *West Coast Line Number 37* (Spring 2002) 131.
33. *Writing and Difference* is a collection of Jacques Derrida's essays written between 1959 and 1966, which emphasize his systematic deconstruction of Western metaphysics. The book

includes Derrida's noteworthy essay on Descartes and Foucault. See Derrida's *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 297-98.

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